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Zusammenfassung 
 
Als Reaktion auf innerstaatliche Konflikte und den in diesem Umfeld oft zu beobachtenden 
Missbrauch humanitärer Hilfe nach Ende des Kalten Krieges entstand die Forderung nach 
einer Einbindung humanitärer Hilfe in Peacebuilding-Strategien. Die bisherige Diskussion 
um solch ein synergetisches Vorgehen hat die Charakteristika humanitärer Organisationen 
dabei jedoch weitgehend ignoriert. Dieser Artikel geht der Frage nach, inwiefern eine Koali-
tion aus humanitärer Hilfe und Peacebuilding machbar erscheint angesichts der Spezifika von 
Hilfsorganisationen. Ausgehend vom Konzept des Peacebuilding werden drei, für eine mögli-
che Einbindung humanitärer Hilfe in Peacebuilding wesentliche Faktoren diskutiert: Erstens, 
die Vereinbarkeit der Ziele und Motivationen von humanitärer Hilfe und Peacebuilding, 
zweitens, die von Hilfsorganisationen vorgenommene Positionierung der eigenen Arbeit in 
Bezug zu politischen Akteuren und zum politischen Umfeld und drittens, die Fähigkeit zur 
Analyse des politischen Umfelds humanitärer Hilfe. Diese Diskussion macht zum einen die 
Heterogenität humanitärer Akteure deutlich und kommt insgesamt zu dem Ergebnis, dass 
eine Einbindung humanitärer Hilfe in Peacebuilding nur äußerst begrenzt möglich ist. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The nature of intra-state conflicts and the political manipulation of humanitarian aid in the 
1990s has led to the popular postulate that humanitarianism has to be included as an instru-
ment for peacebuilding efforts. So far, the debate surrounding such a linkage has largely ig-
nored the nature and behaviour of aid agencies. This paper focuses on the feasibility of in-
cluding humanitarian action into peacebuilding strategies by taking a closer look at the reality 
of humanitarian organisations. Based upon the concept of peacebuilding, three sets of prereq-
uisites for successfully combining humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts will be discussed: 
the compatibility of the objectives pursued in humanitarianism and peacebuilding, the percep-
tion of politics by aid agencies, and their capacity to analyse the political context of aid. The 
analysis highlights the heterogeneity of humanitarian actors and concludes that their contribu-
tion to peacebuilding can only be very limited. 
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1. Introduction1 
Since the beginning of academic reflection on humanitarian aid, the debate has focused on the 
relation between humanitarianism and politics. Further discussing this connection, however, 
has become redundant. As Nicholas Leader states (2000:15): “Saying that humanitarian action 
is political is like saying orange is a colour, true, but not very illuminating”.  
The basic assumption that humanitarian aid has an impact on the political context in 
which it is being given has led to the postulate of embedding humanitarianism in peacebuild-
ing strategies. Such a strategy has been advocated by two sides. First, intergovernmental or-
ganisations such as the United Nations and the European Union have argued in favour of link-
ing humanitarian assistance to peacebuilding efforts (Boutros-Ghali 1992, European Commis-
sion 1996), by pointing to the necessity of co-ordinating peacebuilding efforts in intra-state 
conflicts in the post-Cold War era. It is argued that humanitarian organisations, especially 
NGOs, have a significant part to play in the peacebuilding process considering their specific 
“comparative advantages”, such as local expertise, close links to local actors, better geo-
graphical access and the respect for impartiality (Egeland, 1999:77). These are valuable char-
acteristics which political and government institutions do hardly have. 
Secondly, the linkage of humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding has been postulated 
by scholars as a reaction to the increasing criticism of humanitarian aid in the 1990s, blaming 
aid to support war instead of peace (see, for example, De Waal, 1997). The nature of armed 
conflicts in the post-Cold War era entails that humanitarian aid is given in a highly politicised 
context in which aid agencies are vulnerable to abuse and manipulation. Therefore, if aid 
agencies wish to “do no harm”, they have to focus on developing “capacities for peace” (An-
derson, 1996, 1999).  
Hence, the issue of linking humanitarianism to peacebuilding strategies has been ana-
lysed and proposed mainly by governmental actors and academic observers. The nature and 
behaviour of aid agencies, however, is largely ignored in this predominantly normative debate. 
Thus, our question is not whether humanitarian aid should be linked to peace but whether it 
can fulfil this task provided the characteristics of relief organisations.  
                                                 
1  An earlier draft of this paper has been presented at the 4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, 
8-10 September 2001, University of Kent at Canterbury. 
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Three sets of prerequisites for successfully embedding humanitarianism in peacebuild-
ing are identified and discussed with regard to the reality of aid agencies. This will lead us to 
the overall conclusion that humanitarian organisations can play an important role in civilising 
processes; their contribution to peacebuilding efforts, however, can only be very limited. 
 
 
 
2. Prerequisites for a humanitarianism/peacebuilding coalition 
In order to measure the contribution humanitarian assistance can potentially make to peace-
building strategies we need to take a closer look at the concept of peacebuilding.  
Originally, the term was part of a three-pronged theory of peace - elaborated by Johan 
Galtung and later reaffirmed by then UN General Secretary Boutros-Ghali (1992) - that dis-
tinguishes between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Galtung, 1976). The dis-
tinctive features of this theory were concerned with the objective, the procedure, the target 
groups and the actors involved.  
As opposed to peacemaking and peacekeeping, which aim to establish negative peace 
(i.e. the absence of war), the objective of peacebuilding is positive peace built “around such 
ideas as ‘harmony’, ‘co-operation’ and ‘integration’” (Galtung, 1985:145). Using Galtung’s 
terms, negative peace is the absence of direct violence whereas positive peace as the overall 
objective of peacebuilding efforts means the absence of structural violence (Galtung, 1976: 
297). In short, peacebuilding seeks “to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the 
tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” 
(UN 2000: 3). In addition, peacebuilding is not limited to post-conflict scenarios but also aims 
at the prevention of violence (Cockell, 1998:206).  
As for the procedure, the more classical approach of peacekeeping is basically dissocia-
tive aiming at keeping the antagonists of a conflict away from each other. Peacebuilding, by 
contrast, is an associative approach that addresses the root causes of a conflict and tries to 
promote dialogue, mutual trust, and integration (see Galtung, 1976:297-304). It follows from 
this that peacebuilding “involves a shift of focus away from the warriors, with whom peace-
keepers are mainly concerned, to the attitudes and socioeconomic circumstances of ordinary 
people” (Ryan, 1990:61). Finally, whereas in peacekeeping and peacemaking external actors 
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are the main players involved, the success of peacebuilding as a self-supporting conflict reso-
lution largely depends on the involvement of internal actors.  
These characteristics of peacebuilding lead us to identify three sets of prerequisites for 
successfully combining humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts: the compatibility of the ob-
jectives pursued by humanitarian agencies and peacebuilding missions, the perception of poli-
tics by aid agencies, and their capacity to analyse the political context of aid. 
The first set of prerequisites concerns an aid agency’s primary objectives. Peacebuilding 
addresses the underlying causes of a conflict, namely “economic despair, social injustice, and 
political oppression” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, paragraph 15). Accordingly, peacebuilding tools 
include economic rehabilitation, the provision of equal access to basic goods, and the aboli-
tion of dominance. Peacebuilding to a certain extent means democratisation, since democracy 
“not only opens the space for nonviolent political competition, but also helps to sustain the 
balanced distribution of power that underpins the peace process” (Boyce, 2000:373-374; also 
see Galtung, 1976:300). Humanitarianism has to share these goals if it is to play a significant 
peacebuilding role. With regard to the nature of peacebuilding, aid agencies must be willing to 
undertake long-term projects addressing the root causes of violence by aiming at structural 
changes. In more concrete terms, aid agencies should be willing and able to get involved in 
the (re-)construction of the socioeconomic framework of war-torn societies.  
The second set of prerequisites derives from the definition of peacebuilding as a politi-
cal exercise involving a wide range of actors. Even if we assume that long-term rehabilitation 
and development projects are constitutive elements of peacebuilding strategies, it is important 
to note that “peacebuilding should not be confused with regular, longer-term development 
programs” (Cockell, 1998:206). Development aid addresses issues that can be seen as being 
apolitical such as poverty, resource scarcity, unemployment and so forth. Peacebuilding, by 
contrast, focuses on the distribution of scarce resources and the equal access to goods, i.e. 
issues “that are fundamentally political in nature, even if there are aspects of the conflict (such 
as land tenure, water-sharing) which do not initially admit of overtly political character” 
(Cockell, 1998:207; emphasis in original). Since peacebuilding, as noted above, addresses 
recognition and governance issues, it is by its very nature a political exercise. Aid has an eco-
nomic as well as political impact in war-torn societies and is therefore seen as an important 
actor in this political exercise. Boyce (2000:367) argues:  
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“(...) aid affects not only the size of the economic pie and how it is sliced, but al-
so the balance of power among competing actors and the rules of the game by 
which they compete. (...) the political impacts of aid can help to decide whether 
the peace endures or war resumes.”  
Therefore, we have to discuss in how far humanitarian organisations can be part of such a 
political strategy by identifying, first, their willingness to co-operate with political and gov-
ernmental actors and, second, by taking a closer look at to how humanitarian agencies per-
ceive their relation with politics.  
Finally, peacebuilding can be described as “a comprehensive learning process” (Paffen-
holz, 2001:535), since “there are no set patterns or models applicable to every conflict” 
(Rupesinghe, 1998:139). Any actor involved in peacebuilding efforts has to shape its engage-
ment according to the specific conflict situation. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001), for 
instance, argue that any peacebuilding engagement requires a three-fold analysis that focuses 
on the characteristics of the country, the conflict itself, and the settlement arrangements. Be-
side such an ad-hoc analysis the evaluation of past experience largely determines an actor’s 
peacebuilding capacity. In short, an aid agency’s capacity and willingness to analyse and to 
learn is the third set of prerequisites crucial for estimating the impact of humanitarian aid to 
peacebuilding efforts. 
We will now discuss how well humanitarian organisations pass these three hurdles: the 
compatibility of their objectives with the goals pursued in peacebuilding, the perception of 
politics by aid agencies, and their capacity to analyse the political context of aid. 
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3. Objectives 
Integrating a humanitarian organisation into peacebuilding efforts requires, first, that the or-
ganisation think of its humanitarian work as being related to the abolition of structural vio-
lence in the economic, social, and political sphere. Secondly, due to the nature of peacebuild-
ing, an aid agency has to be willing to pursue long-term goals and structural change. 
 
3.1 Ethical framework 
The ethical framework of an aid agency is complex and hard to define. A distinction, how-
ever, can be made between organisations that “locate their core values firmly in the struggle 
against poverty” as opposed to those who seek “the amelioration and restraint of war” 
(Slim/McConnan, 1998:3). According to Slim and McConnan, there is no causal link between 
an agency’s ethical framework and its original area of intervention. Leader (2000), on the 
other hand, distinguishes between aid agencies dedicated specifically to humanitarian work in 
the context of war and those who initially confined their mandate to emergency work in re-
sponse to natural disasters. Without determining the exact relation between an aid agency’s 
ethical framework and its original field of activity, it is obvious that different ethical frame-
works go along with different sets of objectives concerning humanitarian action. Slim and 
McConnan (1998:4) identify  
“(...) a fundamental rub between the value of social justice (...) and humanitari-
anism. The former usually seeks the re-ordering of society into a new society 
while the latter seeks the restraint of the existing society in war. The (...) goal 
of political and social change is thus more essentially structural than the more 
interim ethic of political and military restraint of humanitarianism” (emphasis 
in original).2  
With regard to their ethical framework aid agencies clearly do not share a common set of val-
ues which each other. Moreover, the classical humanitarian objective to help the victims of 
war according to the principles of International Humanitarian Law is per se more difficult to 
include in peacebuilding strategies than a welfare conception adhered to by a number of aid 
agencies. 
                                                 
2  In spite of these ethical differences that, according to Slim and McConnan (1998), only qualify one type of 
aid agencies as “humanitarian“, we will use the term “humanitarian“ and “aid“ organisation synonymously for 
describing organisations that provide food, water, shelter and/or medical care.  
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3.2 Long-term goals and structural change 
In order to be a capable actor in peacebuilding strategies, an aid agency must be willing to 
achieve long-term goals and structural change. Mary B. Anderson (1999:146) states that “aid 
workers should try to identify local capacities for peace and connectors and design their aid 
programs to support and reinforce them.” As successful cases she mentions food for work 
programmes, educational projects, and rehabilitation programmes in agriculture, health, edu-
cation, and water as well as the dissemination of International Humanitarian Law in a number 
of countries (Anderson, 1999). This short list already illustrates the fundamental problem that 
lies in peacebuilding as a humanitarian objective: supporting “capacities for peace” means the 
pursuit of long-term projects including rehabilitation and development programmes. Yet, such 
a field of activity collides with the classical understanding of humanitarian action as a means 
to provide short-term emergency relief in order to save human lives (see, for example, Brau-
man, 1995; Slim, 2001; Eberwein, 2001a).. Evidently, the discussion on humanitarianism and 
peacebuilding is closely related to the debate on linking relief, rehabilitation, and development 
(see European Commission, 1996). 
In examining the reality of humanitarian work, no clear distinction between relief, reha-
bilitation, and development can be made that allows one to clearly assign one field of activity 
to a certain type of organisation. Doctors Without Borders (MSF), for instance, is usually 
named a “classical” relief agency. In the year 2000, however, the French section of MSF spent 
a considerable portion of its operational expenditures (about 38%) on mid- and long-term 
missions (support of health facilities, psychological assistance, projects for street children).3 
Yet the assumption that every humanitarian organisation is per se willing to undertake long-
term projects and to seek structural change is misleading. Aid agencies are active in different 
sectors depending on the situational context. In North Korea, for instance, MSF failed to es-
tablish emergency relief programmes and therefore decided to leave the country. MSF now 
criticises the NGOs still present in the country not for providing aid to the population of North 
Korea (mostly agricultural rehabilitation projects). What MSF criticises is that these organisa-
tions call their aid “humanitarian”. This term is, in the MSF perspective, reserved for short-
term emergency aid.  
                                                 
3  The geographical spread shows that mid- and long-term projects are merely undertaken in countries where 
either no emergency situation can be detected (e.g. Cambodia, China or Peru) or where this kind of project 
goes along with emergency relief (South Sudan). Médecins Sans Frontières (2001): Rapport financier. Comp-
tes 2000. Paris: Médecins Sans Frontières.  
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The North Korea experience illustrates that - however artificial the distinction between 
relief, rehabilitation, and development might be - the activity in one sector or another reflects 
each agency’s ethical framework. This ethical framework may or may not be compatible with 
peacebuilding. Therefore, the willingness to provide societal change through long-term pro-
jects as an important prerequisite for peacebuilding, cannot be taken for granted.  
It is noteworthy that the willingness to provide structural and societal change seems to 
coincide with an ethical framework that opposes poverty to welfare but not war to peace. On 
the other hand, the humanitarian ethic that derives from war is related to short-term relief 
objectives. Thus, so far it seems that the more development oriented group of aid agencies 
fulfils the first set of prerequisites for being an effective actor in peacebuilding initiatives.  
 
 
 
4. The perception of politics 
As noted earlier, peacebuilding is a fundamentally political exercise implemented by a wide 
range of external and internal actors. Under these conditions the question to pose is how far 
are humanitarian organisations willing to co-operate with political and governmental actors. 
We will now take a closer look at their perception of humanitarian work in relation to politics. 
 
4.1 Conceptualisation of neutrality  
Aid cannot promote peace on its own but has to be part of a wider strategy including political 
and governmental actors. As Donini (1998:94) states: “We cannot wait for peace in order to 
start reconstruction. We must take conflict for granted and integrate humanitarian action and 
development with politics.” Thus, the inclusion of humanitarian action in peacebuilding ef-
forts requires that humanitarian agencies be willing to co-operate with those actors tradition-
ally involved in peacebuilding - political and governmental actors. 
Authors who argue in favour of the humanitarianism/peacebuilding coalition identify 
the lack of co-ordination between NGOs and governmental actors as “the greatest obstacle” 
(Egeland, 1999:77). An agency’s willingness to co-operate with political actors is primarily 
determined by their understanding of neutrality as a classical principle of humanitarian action. 
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Their perception of their own neutrality defines an aid agency’s position towards politics and 
political actors.  
Neutrality has been a highly contested issue among scholars as well as among aid agen-
cies. Leader states that “the most significant discussions, disagreements, confusions and con-
ceptual developments have been around the idea of neutrality” (2000: 19). He distinguishes 
between the classical conception of neutrality as a necessary means to protect the rights of 
non-combatants (“neutrality elevated”) and an explicitly political humanitarianism that con-
tributes to political objectives (“neutrality abandoned”). The third concept he describes is a 
“Third-way humanitarianism” which involves initiating constructive social change while up-
holding the imperative of not taking sides (Leader, 2000:20, 21).  
The main point to be made here is that the willingness to co-operate with political actors 
for peacebuilding objectives appears incompatible with the traditional concept of neutral hu-
manitarianism. The classical understanding of neutrality sees any subordination to political 
goals and institutions as a risk to the main task, which is the alleviation of suffering (see, 
among others, Götze, 1999; Eberwein, 2001a). In this vision, peace is regarded as an ultimate 
goal and a universal ideal. Peacebuilding by contrast, as defined above, has to be understood 
as the promotion of “a particular peace” (Slim/McConnan, 1998:22) that deals with political 
alliances and political interests. Thus, in the perspective of “neutrality elevated”, peacebuild-
ing is seen as a political goal that should be achieved by others than humanitarian actors. In 
short, agencies adhering to the classical concept of neutrality “see humanitarian aid as for the 
relief of suffering only rather than also having a developmental or peacebuilding role” 
(Leader, 2000:20).  
In North Korea, for instance, the promotion of peace as an objective by humanitarian 
NGOs is highly contested among the aid agencies involved. In spite of South Korean NGOs 
claiming to include the terms “reconciliation” and “peace” in the final report of an interna-
tional NGO meeting, no such passage is to be found in the final draft.4 Western NGOs suc-
cessfully argued that these terms imply a political engagement which has to be kept off from 
humanitarian action.  
The second concept, the abandonment of neutrality in favour of an explicitly political 
humanitarianism can be neglected here, since it stems from academic concepts and donor in-
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terests (see Leader, 2000) rather than reflecting the conceptual background of aid agencies, 
which is the focus of this study. The third type of neutrality, however, finds some support 
among humanitarian NGOs which seem to be more open to co-operation with political actors, 
has to be discussed in greater detail.  
“Third-way humanitarianism” does not regard neutrality as an obligation to stay away 
from political goals and strategies. In this perspective neutrality simply means that aid work-
ers should refrain from taking sides in a conflict. The principle of neutrality is still upheld but 
more importance is attached to a common strategy and to co-operative efforts with political 
and governmental actors. As noted above, these categorisations are ideal types that cannot 
necessarily be applied one-to-one to the reality of aid agencies. Nevertheless, even if one ig-
nores the alleged incompatibility of the ”Do-no-harm”-approach with the principle of neutral-
ity - seen as outmoded by some, regarded as indispensable by others - still one question re-
mains unanswered. Does the willingness to co-operate with politics go along with a political 
consciousness that situates humanitarian action as being part of a wider, political strategy? 
“The conceptualisation of politics in this position is the hardest to pin down”, according to 
Leader (2000:21). Duffield adds that “development relief has a different understanding of 
conflict; in a sense it has no understanding at all” (1998:70). After having discussed the will-
ingness to co-operate we now have to focus on the political consciousness of humanitarian 
organisations. 
 
4.2 The political/non-political divide 
As noted above, an agency’s definition of neutrality determines its position on co-operation 
with political actors. It is, however, not necessarily related to an agency’s conception of its 
own role towards politics. A peacebuilding role is, at heart, a political role, consequently, a 
humanitarian organisation has to think of its work as being interlinked to the political envi-
ronment of a humanitarian crisis.  
As noted earlier, saying that humanitarian work has political consequences and, thus, is 
political, is redundant. Aid agencies, however, do not describe their work as being political, 
nor do they openly claim to be political actors. This is illustrated by Jean Pictet’s often quoted 
description of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that “like a swimmer, is 
                                                                                                                                                        
4  See Report of the Third International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea. 
Cooperative Efforts beyond Food Aid. Final Report. 20 June 2001. Yong In (Republic of Korea). 
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in politics up to its neck. Also like the swimmer, who advances in the water but who drowns 
if he swallows it, the ICRC must reckon with politics without becoming a part of it” (quoted 
in Minear, 1999a:66). It may be counterproductive to the objectives of a humanitarian organi-
sation to assert that it is political. “The trick then is not to believe one’s own propaganda”, as 
Leader adds, even though aid organisations do “believe their own propaganda and continue to 
think of themselves as in some ways non-political” (Leader, 2000:50). 
Nevertheless, some considerable differences concerning aid agencies’ political self-
conception become evident when it comes to the delicate issue of speaking out about human 
rights violation witnessed by aid workers. Often discussed in relation to the principle of neu-
trality (see Minear, 1999a) this issue illustrates to a certain extent how far a humanitarian ac-
tor thinks of himself as non-political, i.e. as working in a sphere that is distinct from politics. 
In fact, the practice of not denouncing human rights violations is often justified by an 
agency’s conviction that humanitarian work is non-political, carried out by non-political ac-
tors who’s function is to provide help to the needy without getting involved with politics. In 
such a perspective, public denounciation of human rights violation is a task that has to be ful-
filled by others. Consequently, aid agencies that do not share this conviction are often criti-
cised for being a human rights organisation rather than a humanitarian agency.  
The willingness to closely co-operate with political actors and an aid agency’s percep-
tion of humanitarian action as a political activity have been identified as important prerequi-
sites of successfully embedding humanitarianism in peacebuilding efforts. In both respects, 
considerable differences between aid agencies are obvious. The classical understanding of 
neutrality derived from war sees humanitarianism as intertwined with politics but puts strong 
emphasis on the principle of independence from it. This hinders close co-operation between 
aid and politics. By contrast, a more recent and flexible conceptualisation of neutrality, theo-
retically allows co-operation with politics but is linked to the perception of humanitarian ac-
tion as being outside the political sphere. Therefore, the willingness to co-operate with politi-
cal actors goes along with the conviction of being non-political.  
Taking into account the differences with regard to the first set of prerequisites - the ethi-
cal framework and the willingness to provide longer-term structural change – it has to be ad-
ded that the preparedness to provide structural change is related to a flexible understanding of 
                                                                                                                                                        
erative Efforts beyond Food Aid. Final Report. 20 June 2001. Yong In (Republic of Korea). 
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of neutrality and a self-understanding of being a non-political actor. In other words, the more 
an organisation is willing to reckon with politics, the less prepared it is to provide structural 
change in collaboration with political institutions.  
The conviction of being a non-political actor - often criticised and put on a par with po-
litical naivety (see, for a summary, Leader, 2000:20) - clearly inhibits the inclusion of humani-
tarian action in the political strategy of peacebuilding. The term of political naivety points at 
an issue that is often described as a weak point of humanitarianism: the capacity to analyse the 
political context of aid.  
 
 
 
5. Learning processes 
As noted earlier, aid agencies have to understand the political environment in which they act 
in order to address the problems and obstacles they are confronted with in their humanitarian 
work. Political naivety on the part of aid agencies leaves them open to manipulation and 
makes it difficult to include humanitarianism in the essentially political strategy of peace-
building. Without identifying the causes of a conflict it is impossible to pave the way to peace. 
More precisely, relief agencies “should be aware of socio-economic disparities and gender-
related issues; understand the prevailing disparities and security environment; and be able to 
analyze and build upon local strengths and coping mechanisms” (Smillie. 1998:54). 
 
5.1 Capacity to learn 
The capacity to analyse the political context of a humanitarian crisis is closely related to the 
willingness to learn from past experiences. However, most case studies that focus on relief 
activities conclude that aid agencies lack the capacity to learn. More than 20 years ago Taylor 
and Cuny wrote: “Deliberate and conscious learning from experience is not part of the non-
profit welfare tradition” (1979:37). Essentially, this finding does not seem to have lost much 
of its validity (see Shawcross, 1984; Van Brabant/Killick, 1999; Terry, 2000; Schloms, 2000).  
NGOs seem to deny the necessity to learn by arguing that every crisis is unique. To a 
certain extent, this point is legitimate. However, each crisis involves a similar set of aid insti-
tutions (United Nations, Red Cross, NGOs) that have to deal with a similar set of problems 
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and obstacles, i.e. denial of access, manipulation of aid, etc. In some cases, the parallels be-
tween situations are particularly striking. As Minear (1999b:310) observes: “The manipulation 
of belligerent and criminal elements of the refugee camps in eastern Zaire in 1994 was a rerun 
of problems unaddressed in Cambodian refugee camps along the Thai border years before.” 
Generally speaking, the dilemma of humanitarian action reoccurs whenever aid is being given 
in a highly politicised environment. Ignoring similar precedent cases means that aid agencies 
have to reinvent the wheel over and over again. 
The “overemphasis on the idiosyncratic” (Minear, 1999b:310) does not, however, give 
fruit to an operational approach designed to cope with the particular necessities of every crisis. 
A certain inappropriateness of aid projects is often identified in evaluation programmes. Smil-
lie, for instance, states (1998:53): “Inappropriate blueprint-type reconstruction and rehabilita-
tion programs continue to abound, in part because of the absence of institutional learning.” In 
short, a lack of learning processes has been detected as a striking feature among aid agencies 
by various authors. So, what are the organisational characteristics of humanitarian organisa-
tions that seem to thwart learning processes?  
Two basic observations can be made. Firstly, it is the very nature of humanitarianism to 
be reactive. Unlike a private company selling a specific product and being able to actively 
influence the demand through marketing strategies or technological innovations, giving aid is 
purely responsive to the needs of a population. Therefore, humanitarian staff has to cope with 
fast-evolving ad hoc situations that hardly leave time for reflection. This “hyperactive pace” 
(Minear, 1999b:310), stemming from the very nature of humanitarianism, evidently limits the 
capacity to learn from own experience.  
Secondly, high staff turnover is a characteristic of the vast majority of aid organisations. 
Usually, expatriate staff is employed only for a certain period of time in a given mission. A 
study on major French humanitarian NGOs, for instance, estimates that 40 percent to 70% of 
the personnel leaves the organisation after having worked as an expatriate on one project 
(Davis, 1999). It is hard to find senior aid workers who have spent all their work life in one 
single organisation. It seems to be common use to try out agencies until one finds the organi-
sation that best suits one’s own expectations. Consequently, for those who have a critical view 
on an agency’s approach it is more convenient to leave the organisation than it is to try to 
achieve some change within the agency. It goes without saying that both factors - the high 
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staff turnover as well as the loss of unsatisfied and critical personnel - have a negative impact 
upon an organisation’s learning capacity. 
Is the lack of learning processes intrinsic to humanitarianism? If we assume that hu-
manitarianism as a response to temporary needs is a stressful job that does not allow to take a 
step back and to reflect and that necessarily requires the short-term employment of staff, then 
the absence of institutional learning has to be taken for granted, has to be accepted as a force 
majeure. Learning from the past, as outlined above, is closely linked to the capacity to analyse 
the political context in which humanitarian aid is being given, a capacity which, in turn, is an 
essential prerequisite for playing a peacebuilding role. In order to determine whether some 
remedies to the constraints to learning can be detected, organisational learning theory provides 
some helpful insight. 
 
5.2 Willingness to learn 
According to a classical definition, organisational learning describes the process of “respond-
ing to changes in the internal and external environments of the organization by detecting and 
correcting errors in organizational theory-in-use, and embedding the results (…) in private 
images and shared maps of the organization” (Argyris/Schön, 1978:29). We describe “results” 
as “information” and the process of “embedding the results” in images and maps as “knowl-
edge”. In other words, organisational learning comprises, first, the acquisition of knowledge 
by a group of individuals, second, its diffusion to the organisational level and third, the stor-
age in an institutional memory from where it can be distributed again to individual members 
of the organisation (“phase model”)5.   
Analysing the acquisition of knowledge by the individual aid worker is largely a psycho-
logical task that goes beyond the scope of this paper. We will discuss the second and third 
phase, i.e. the diffusion and storage of knowledge, since these phases relate to the organisa-
tional level.  
The diffusion of knowledge is essentially a matter of communication between the indi-
vidual and the organisation. However, this communication seems to be highly problematic 
                                                 
5  The phase model has been criticised by authors who regard learning processes as part of working processes in 
which innovation plays a key role (see, for an overview on the debate, Berthoin Antal, 1998; Berthoin 
Antal/Dierkes, 2000). For the purpose of this paper, however, the phase model seems to be an appropriate 
concept to describe the characteristics of aid agencies.  
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inside humanitarian organisations. This is in part due to the unique organisational structure of 
humanitarian agencies. They usually consist of a stable, organised, and more or less hierarchi-
cal headquarters that controls and co-ordinates remote groups of staff in the field which are 
composed for a limited period of time. Evidently, this ever changing twin-structure (see 
Davis, 1999) hampers communication and the transfer of knowledge, particularly during the 
course of a project. Thus, the diffusion of knowledge from the individual to the organisational 
level and vice versa is facilitated whenever both levels directly communicate with each other. 
These opportunities (briefing and debriefing of expatriate staff), however, are rarely used. 
Usually, aid workers report that they have not been sufficiently prepared for their missions 
and complain that headquarters shows little interest in the gained experiences once an indi-
vidual term has ended. Thus, institutionalised diffusion of knowledge is rarely found (see 
Bronner, 1999, Davis, 1999).  
The third phase, the storage of knowledge on an organisational level, is another weak 
point of humanitarian organisations. Documentation centers or research units inside humani-
tarian NGOs that gather, evaluate, and diffuse gained experiences are rare. Providing and edu-
cating staff for learning processes is expensive. Furthermore, according to the prevailing hu-
manitarian logic, all available money should be spent on the direct alleviation of human suf-
fering. Finally, aid agencies depend on private donations and public funds that are received by 
pointing out needs on one side, and the agency’s ability to fulfil those needs on the other. The 
capacity to learn, by contrast, has no marketing appeal. On the contrary, minimal administra-
tive costs are seen as a big plus among donors and thus, among aid organisations as well. In a 
case study on humanitarian action in Afghanistan, for instance, Van Brabant and Killick 
(1999:6) state: 
“Greater emphasis on finer conflict analysis, on more sophisticated forms of inter-
action with conflict entrepreneurs, on skillful negotiations, on strategic coordina-
tion, on local peacebuilding and the like, requires not only highly qualified staff 
but is also intensive in staff time investment. Yet budget considerations remain in-
spired by a now outmoded ‘commodity logic’ that allocates staff expenses to 
‘overhead’ and seeks to keep ‘overhead’ to the absolute minimum.” 
The lack of learning processes is thus, not only related to the nature of humanitarian work. A 
certain reluctance to dedicate financial resources to develop learning mechanisms and institu-
tional memory is obvious. Therefore, the lack of learning processes cannot be totally ascribed 
to the specific activity and structure of aid agencies as a force majeure. The absence of learn-
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ing processes cannot be entirely blamed on a structural lack of capacity; a lack of willingness, 
too, seems to play a role. The unwillingness to dedicate financial resources in order to store 
and diffuse knowledge – at least in part out of respect for donors – gives a hint as to the fun-
damental obstacle to learning processes inside humanitarianism: the perception of responsibil-
ity.  
With regard to the general characteristics of humanitarianism much has been written on 
the “defensiveness toward criticism” (Minear, 1999b:311), a “fear of, and a consequent aver-
sion to, evaluation” (Smillie, 1998:53) reflecting a “culture of justification” which is due to a 
“logic of institutional preservation” (Terry, 2000). In fact, openly questioning the success of 
an aid project means to put future funds at risk. Any doubt that is expressed with regard to a 
certain practice or approach potentially weakens an agency’s position towards donors. Unlike 
private companies that are obliged, first and foremost, to meet the demands of their clients, 
the survival of aid agencies does not depend on the decision of their beneficiaries. The capac-
ity to learn from past experience is decisive to the survival of a business company. The same 
incentive cannot be found in humanitarianism. At least not in the short-run. In the first place, 
humanitarian organisations see responsibility as accountability to their donors. 
As a result, the inclusion of humanitarian work into peacebuilding strategies depends to 
a certain extent on the establishment of new procedures of accountability in order to 
strengthen learning mechanisms (also see Eberwein, 2001b). A recent trend towards the 
evaluation of humanitarian assistance can be observed. This proliferation of “lessons learned 
units”, however, does not go along with a new understanding of accountability. On the con-
trary, this development – largely originated from donor pressure after the experience in the 
Great Lakes region – has led to further strengthening humanitarianism’s accountability to the 
donor side. The idea of establishing an ombudsman for the beneficiaries in a humanitarian 
mission, as developed by a consortium of British NGOs (see Doane, 1999), finds only few 
support. Moreover, the lack of institutional learning mechanisms, as outlined above, is not 
addressed by these evaluation studies, since these studies are mainly executed by external 
agencies. In some cases this might be helpful, the establishment of learning mechanisms in-
side the organisations, however, is not achieved. Thus, Minear and Weiss conclude: “The rush 
to create lessons learned units is not to be confused with the learning of lessons. To the extent 
that many of the so-called lessons remain relegated to file drawers, the idea is a perversion of 
the concept of learning” (quoted in Smillie, 1998:56). 
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Finally, beside the question how organisations learn, the question what they learn is 
equally crucial. Evaluations so far analyse the experience made in the field and tend to ignore 
organisational frameworks and procedures of aid agencies (see Wood, Apthorpe and Borton, 
2001:210). Moreover, most of the evaluation efforts focus on the operational, technical side of 
humanitarian work. In other words, information is gathered without creating knowledge (see 
Smillie, 1998:56). Knowledge in the sense of “embedding the results in private images and 
shared maps of the organization” means to analyse the operational experience in relation to 
the normative framework of an aid agency, to the principles of action.  
In fact, some agencies do discuss and question their principles of action on the basis of 
past experience. In his analysis of the willingness of aid agencies to discuss issues of princi-
ples, Leader observed that some agencies “were on the whole more interested in, and articu-
late about, issues of humanitarian principles and often took the lead in the development of the 
mechanisms under discussion”; others “were less concerned with, or interested in, the mecha-
nisms” (2000:42). Again, discussing the prerequisites for including humanitarianism in 
peacebuilding strategies has revealed considerable differences among humanitarian actors. 
 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The debate surrounding humanitarianism as a player in peacebuilding is largely of a normative 
nature, which focuses on the desirability of a common approach for the benefit of durable 
peace. Questioning the feasibility of such a common strategy, however, has identified numer-
ous obstacles related to the very nature of humanitarian organisations. Three major conditions 
have been discussed that aid agencies theoretically have to fulfil in order to support peace-
building: 
1. The objectives of humanitarian action need to include the abolition of structural vio-
lence and the promotion of positive peace by means of mid- and long-term rehabilita-
tion. 
2. Aid agencies must be willing to co-operate with political and governmental actors. This 
is based upon a perception of humanitarian aid as being closely interlinked to the politi-
cal context in which it is being given (perception of politics). 
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3. Humanitarian organisations need to be willing and capable to analyse the political 
context of a humanitarian crisis and to learn from past experience.  
The analysis of the nature and behaviour of aid agencies has led to two main findings. First, 
considerable differences among humanitarian organisations have been revealed that concern 
each of the criteria mentioned above. Humanitarian NGOs are often referred to as a “commu-
nity” suggesting a homogenous group sharing the same approaches and principles. But the 
perception of the sense, the environment, and the history of humanitarian action differs to an 
extent that does not allow to speak of a common identity. Heterogeneity, however, seems to 
be the striking feature among aid agencies reflecting “cultures that never meet” (Leader, 2000: 
42). It is noteworthy that the academic discourse – including the discussion on the humanitari-
anism/peacebuilding coalition - largely ignores this heterogeneity, whereas aid agencies them-
selves seem to highlight, not to say exaggerate, these differences.6 It goes without saying that 
the heterogeneity characterising humanitarian organisations renders it difficult to identify a 
common conceptual basis, allowing for a systematic linkage between humanitarianism and 
peacebuilding.  
Secondly and even more importantly, the prerequisites for including humanitarian action 
in peacebuilding contravene the reality of humanitarianism. An aid agency that primarily 
seeks to restrain violence and to promote peace, that is willing to provide structural and socie-
tal change, prepared to co-operate with governmental and political actors for the benefit of a 
common political strategy, and that, finally, is willing and able to analyse the political context 
of its action, is an illusion. If an agency fulfils some of these conditions it will very likely not 
satisfy others. Political consciousness seems to be linked to a strict conceptualisation of neu-
trality hindering any institutional co-operation with governmental actors. The goal of struc-
tural change does not coincide with a political consciousness and a sufficient capacity to ana-
lyse the political context of a crisis. 
Leader (2000) distinguishes “food agencies” from “health agencies”, thus describing the 
activity profile as the main distinctive feature. Others argue that the heterogeneity is primarily 
based on differing philosophical backgrounds, opposing a charity or philanthropy based hu-
                                                 
6  See Slim/McConnan (1998:19): “In most maps, agencies tended to identify themselves with an inner core of 
like-minded agencies. They then produced very definite periphery of acceptable but significantly different 
agencies and then a small clutch of two or three who were frequently anathematised and dismissed into the 
outer darkness!”  
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manitarianism to a more rights-based approach (see, for example, Slim, 2001). It surely mat-
ters whether humanitarian aid derives from an act of charity or whether it is seen as a duty out 
of respect for human rights. Trying to understand whether these different value sets determine 
the divergent set of objectives, perceptions of politics, and the differences in learning proc-
esses goes beyond the scope of this paper. The main point to be made here is that humanitari-
anism cannot play a peacebuilding role if one considers the nature and behaviour of humani-
tarian organisations.  
Under these conditions, peacebuilding strategies designed by international donors have 
to be questioned. Empirical evidence shows many peacebuilding strategies to be inappropriate 
because they put “disproportionate emphasis on infrastructure as opposed to peace implemen-
tation” (Boyce, 2000:370). We have to add that the overemphasis of the aid component (infra-
structure, economic transition) within these peacebuilding packages is not only harmful to the 
people it is intended to help (see Forman/Patrick, 2000), but can also do damage to the integ-
rity of humanitarianism. 
As a result, one should be more modest about the influence aid can exercise on violence 
and conflict. Aid cannot stop war nor can it build peace. Humanitarianism can hardly influ-
ence whether competing actors deploy violence or not, but it does have an impact on the rules 
by which they compete. And it can insist, at every stage of a conflict, on the distribution of aid 
according to the humanitarian logic only. Therefore, humanitarianism per se - through its 
presence, its work and its principles - facilitates civilising processes in war-torn societies. 
Claiming a peacebuilding coalition consisting of aid and politics, however, ignores the very 
nature of humanitarian organisations. 
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